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NOTES
DISCRETION: THE BETTER PART OF
VALOR IN THE WAR ON DRUGS
In 1982, President Ronald Reagan declared the "War on
Drugs."' In response to this declaration, Congress insisted on the
creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines").2 The
Guidelines were intended to promote stricter sentencing, and
eliminate disparity in sentencing.3 Many hoped stringent guide-
1 See President's Radio Address to Nation on Federal Drug Policy, 18 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1249, 1250 (Oct. 2, 1982). In his address President Ronald Reagan stated: "The
mood toward drugs is changing in this country, and the momentun is with us .... Drugs
are bad and we're going after them.... [Wle've taken down the surrender flag and run up
the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on drugs." Id.; see also Diane-Michele Kras-
now, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 Am. J.
CRim. L. 219, 221 (1992); Whitman Knapp, One Vietnam Was Enough, NEWSDAY, Apr. 30,
1993, at 60. The President's speech created a shift in public opinion not only against the
drug trafficker, but also the casual user. Id.
2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1993) (establishing purpose and scope of Federal Sentencing
Commission); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1983) (act was part of Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984).
3 See H.R. REP. No. 3315, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at § 2(1) (1994). Congressional
findings indicate that the current national crime and drug strategy has failed, and longer
prison sentences have not reduced crime. Id.; Eric P. Berlin, The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines' Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before
Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 187, 196. The author noted:
The Guidelines' limitations on judicial sentencing discretion... have had several un-
desired effects. These changes have resulted in continued disparity in sentencing, an
increased burden on the taxpayers for the costs of imprisoning so many offenders, and
a loss of integrity for the judiciary and the criminal justice system. By failing to elimi-
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lines would counter the drug problem. 4 However, the general con-
sensus is that the Guidelines have not eliminated this problem.5
Today, drug offenders constitute sixty percent of the federal prison
population, as compared to twenty-five percent in 1980.6 As a con-
sequence of the Guidelines, federal and state prison populations
have exploded and drug use has steadily increased.7 Although the
Guidelines have generated more arrests, many problems have
arisen.8 The use of the Guidelines has not deterred drug use; there
is continued sentencing disparity; there are problems of judicial
sentencing discretion; and there are constitutional abuses.9 These
problems are a clear indication that the Guidelines are not achiev-
ing their desired results, thus leading critics to argue that this is
not the proper weapon.'0
naie sentencing disparity, the Guidelines violate the congressional mandate and often
work injustices against offenders.
Id.
4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing purpose for creation of Guide-
lines). See generally Phyllis J. Newton, et al., Decade of Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting
the Role of the Legislature, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 305, 305 (1993). In response to the
drug problem, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act which was the furthest reach-
ing reform of federal sentencing in the country's history. Id.
5 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 60. The author has expressed the opinion that "[t]he na-
tion's accomplishments in Vietnam were a brilliant success compared with its accomplish-
ments in the 'War on Drugs.'" Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 3315, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at § 2(1) (1994). Congress declared in its findings that the current national crime and drug
strategy has failed. Id.
6 See Myriam Marquez, Mandatory Drug Sentences Make for Full Prisons, Empty Vic-
tory, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., June 2, 1993, at A10 (48,000 of 84,000 federal prisoners
incarcerated for drug offenses).
7 See id. This explosion has been criticized, because small time dealers and users are
occupying limited prison space which could be used for more violent and dangerous
criminals who are being released. Id.
8 See The State of Criminal Justice: An Annual Report, 1993 ABA SEC. CRIM. JUST. 7
[hereinafter Criminal Justice Report]. Between 1986 and 1991, the proportion of the prison
population made up of drug offenders increased from nine percent to twenty-two percent.
Id. Meanwhile, the proportion for violent offenders actually decreased by ten percent; and
the proportion for serious property offenders decreased by six percent. Id. These percent-
ages reflect a trend towards pre-occupation with non-violent drug offenders leading to se-
vere prison overcrowding and the release of violent criminals. Id.
9 See Stanley Meisler, Nothing Works, L.A. TIMEs, May 7, 1989, (Magazine), at 20, 24
(indicating that increased law enforcement effort has not hurt drug trade because drug
prices have declined in 1980s); see also Daniel J. Winters, Note, Encouraging Defendant's to
Overcome Their Drug Addictions in the Period Between Arrest and Sentencing: A Proposed
Amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (stating
dramatic increase in number of arrests indicates successful government policy, with minor
impact on drug use); Michael Tackett, Minor Drug Player's are Paying Big Prices, Cm.
Tam., Oct. 15, 1990, at 1, 6 (22.8 percent of defendant's convicted of drug offenses prior to
Guidelines, while 48.3 percent convicted for drug-related crimes since enactment of
Guidelines).
10 See Charles J. Ogletree Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1954 (1988). Congress when formulating
Guidelines urged commission to consider "capacity" of federal prisons, nevertheless, since
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While the Guidelines reflect a new perspective towards the
"War on Drugs," they remain consistent with the Nation's earlier
approaches to criminal justice.11 Historically, the United States
emphasized capital punishment as a means of deterrence. 12 This
emphasis shifted in the 1800s towards longer prison sentences
and the philosophy of rehabilitation, which remained in "vogue"' 3
until the mid-1970s.14 In the late 1970s, rehabilitation was de-
nounced as ineffective because it created a "revolving door,"15
whereby offenders were deemed reformed and released only to
commit new crimes.'" At the same time, the criminal justice sys-
tem created disproportionate sentencing for similar crimes, leav-
ing many to question the system's fairness and certainty.' 7 As a
result, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") in
1987 as a means of eliminating disparity and imposing harsher
penalties for drug offenders.' 8 The SRA created the Federal Sen-
tencing Commission (the "Commission") which was authorized to
its enactment federal prisons are overcrowded by fifty-six percent. Id.; see also Alan B.
Fischler, Enough is Enough of the War on Drugs, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 14, 1993, at 2 (enhanced
enforcement efforts and tougher drug penalties have increased drug use and violence);
Michael Tackett, Drug War Chokes Federal Courts: Assembly-Line Justice Perils Legal Sys-
tem, CH. TRm., Oct. 14, 1990, at Cl, C5 (United States District Judge Lawrence Irving
explaining that stiffer sentences do not deter drug related crimes since "there is always
somebody to fill their shoes").
11 See Newton, supra note 4, at 305 (discussing history of sentencing reform).
12 See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1940. "[Mlany early examples of sentencing law fo-
cused on retribution and restitution for the victim" on the theory that the punishment
should fit the crime. Id.; Exodus 21:24-25 (New American). This book from the Bible stated:
"[E]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for
wound, stripe for stripe." Id.; see also DAvm J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:
SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 52-53, 61-62 (1971) (arguing criminal
offenders were not being sanctioned appropriately); Newton, supra note 4, at 305 (discuss-
ing history of sentencing reform).
13 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT. THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 7-23
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (discussing criminal punishment in 1800s). See generally Wil-
liam W. Wilkins, A Decade of Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the Role of the Legislature,
28 WAxE FOREST L. REv. 305, 305 (1993) (outlining history of nation's criminal justice
system).
14 See supra note 13 (nation's criminal justice policy shifted away from rehabilitation
towards longer prison terms); see also Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and An-
swers About Prison Reform, 35 PuB. Im. 22, 22 (1974) (discussing problems with
rehabilitation).
15 See supra notes 13-14. Congress recognized the problem that offenders were often in-
carcerated, deemed rehabilitated, and released only to commit other crimes. Id.; see also S.
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-190 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220,
3220-3373 (explaining need for sentence reform).
16 See Newton, supra note 4, at 305 (arguing rehabilitative system also created un-
wanted sentencing disparity).
17 See supra note 4 (discussing need for mandatory sentences).
18 See supra note 2. The Act was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified throughout 18 and 28 U.S.C.). Id.
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promulgate sentencing guidelines for courts to use when imposing
sentences. 19 The guideline manual, created by the Commission,
established ranges for sentencing that courts must follow.20
This Note examines the problems created by the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines as a weapon in the "War on Drugs." Part One
examines the constitutional issues inherent in the use of the
Guidelines. Part Two focuses on the effect of limiting judicial dis-
cretion in the sentencing procedure. Part Three illustrates the
Guidelines' failure to eliminate sentencing disparity. Finally,
Part Four suggests alternative solutions and legislative reform.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
Since its enactment, questions regarding the constitutionality of
the Guidelines have caused considerable controversy. 2' United
States v. Whyte22 indicated that over one hundred courts ruled in-
consistently on the constitutionality of the Guidelines.23 The
Supreme Court has repelled constitutional attacks pursuant to
Mistretta v. United States,24 by upholding the Sentencing Guide-
lines. 25 The Guidelines have been attacked primarily on the issues
of delegation and separation of powers. 26 Recently, Due Process
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1993) (Sentencing Commission established "as an independent
commission in the judicial branch .... "); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1993) (empowering
Commission with authority to enact sentencing guidelines).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1993) (discussing widest range possible for sentences under
Guidelines).
21 Compare United States v. ,Eastland, 694 F. Supp. 512, 513 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating
that 62 courts have upheld constitutionality of sentencing guidelines) with United States v.
Whyte, 694 F. Supp. 1194, 1194 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting sentencing commissions' advice
that 145 courts have rejected and 106 courts have upheld constitutionality of sentencing
guidelines). See generally Julia L. Black, Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Sentences
Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United States, 75 IowA
L. REv. 767, 768 (1990) (examining constitutionality of 1984 Sentencing Reform Act).
22 694 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1070 (1990).
23 Id. at 1194 n.1.
24 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
25 Id. at 412.
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Section One provides in pertinent part: "[aill legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. .. ." Id. The
Supreme Court has long interpreted this clause to mandate that Congress cannot generally
delegate its legislative power to another branch. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1891). See generally U.S. ComsT. art. II, § 1 (executive branch has authority to execute all
laws); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing judicial branch with power to interpret laws).
[Vol. 9:725
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and the Eighth Amendment have also come to the forefront in
challenging the Guidelines.27
A. The Delegation Issue
Article I of the Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating
its legislative powers to any other branch.28 Originally, some
courts declared the Guidelines void because Congress assigned
the legislative function of the SRA to an independent commis-
sion.2 9 This issue reached the Supreme Court in Mistretta v.
United States,30 in which the Court held that the SRA did not vio-
late the non-delegation doctrine. 3 The Court incorporated the test
set forth in J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States,32 which
ruled that delegation was constitutional if Congress clearly estab-
lished the general policy, and the public agency which was to ap-
ply the policy.3 3 Mistretta followed the test developed in Yakus v.
United States,34 that Congress must provide a proceeding to deter-
27 See generally Charles R. Eskridege III, The Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing
Reform Act After Mistretta v. United States, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 683, 725-40 (1990) (examin-
ing residual constitutional issues remaining after Mistretta).
28 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1. This section provides: "All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives." Id.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 690 F. Supp. 1423, 1425 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (defendant
charged that Guidelines were unconstitutional for denying him right to present evidence
and to challenge basis of his sentence); United States v. Alves, 688 F. Supp. 70, 78 (D.
Mass. 1988). Defendant argued that "Congress had abandoned a 'core function' assigned to
the legislative branch." Id.; United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 1174, 1176-77 (W.D. Pa.
1988) (defendants challenged criminal livelihood provisions in Guidelines which mandated
prison term of no less than 13 months for defendant who committed offense as part of
pattern of criminal conduct from which he derived substantial portion of his income);
United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. 1411, 1415-16 (S.D. Cal. 1988) Defendant
asserted that "Article I of the Constitution absolutely prohibits Congress from delegating
the task of fixing penalties". Id.; United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1469 (S.D.
Cal. 1988) (defendant contended that Commission's establishment and makeup offends
doctrine of separation of powers).
30 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
31 Id. at 371-79.
32 276 U.S. 394 (1927).
33 Id. at 409. The Court held: "[i]f Congress ... lays down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the persons or body authorized to act is directed to conform, such legisla-
tive action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." Id. Chief Justice Taft ex-
plained that "[in determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another
branch the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination." Id. at 406; see also
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ("constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and
the boundaries of this delegated authority.").
34 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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mine whether its policies were being complied with.35 Based on
the Supreme Court's rationale, the SRA falls within Congress's
power under Article I to make all laws necessary and proper to
carry out any power enumerated in the Constitution.36 In today's
ever-changing society, Congress cannot do its job without delegat-
ing power.3 7
In forming the Guidelines, Congress specified a matrix which
matched a given sentencing range to a defendant's "offense
level."3 8 The "offense level" is calculated by determining the "base
level" of a particular offense.3 9 This level is adjusted upwards or
downwards in the sentencing range based on the characteristics
provided in the Guidelines.4 ° By creating this matrix for the com-
mission to apply, Congress has employed the test established in
J. W Hampton Jr. & Co., by instituting a general policy which the
Commission is to follow.4 '
B. The Separation of Powers Issue
At the core of the constitutional attacks on the Guidelines is the
issue of the separation of powers. 42 Separation of Powers is a sys-
tem of checks and balances which regulates the power of the exec-
utive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal govern-
35 Id. at 426. Congress must provide, in the "absence of standards... a proper proceed-
ing to ascertain whether the Congress had been obeyed." Id.
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause provides in relevant part: Congress shall
have power to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution...." Id.
37 See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Division of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941). "[In an
increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were
obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined
legislative policy." Id.; Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 86 (3d Cir. 1984). The court held
that congressional delegation to an administrative agency was valid if accompanied by ar-
ticulation of congressional policy. Id.; Haviland v. Butz, 543 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The Haviland court explained that delegation of powers was necessary to enable Congress
to exert legislative powers effectively. Id.; see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274
(1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). "Delegation of power under general directives is an inevi-
table consequence of our complex society, with its myriad, ever changing, highly technical
problems." Id.; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935). "[Tlhe Constitution
has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicality which will enable it to perform its function." Id.
38 See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1949 (discussing function of Federal Sentencing
Commission).
39 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1993) (explaining computation of sentences through
use of Guideline matrix).
40 See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1949-50. (discussing offense level calculation).
41 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing policy in J.W. Hampton).
42 See Black, supra note 21, at 775. "[All of the sentencing cases raise separation of
powers concerns." Id.
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ment.43 The SRA provides that three of the seven voting members
on the commission are required to be judges." Courts have criti-
cized the constitutionality of the Guidelines,45 because they place
a judge on an independent commission inside the judiciary
whereby he or she cannot exercise power under Article 111.46 Since
judges abandon their Article III powers to act as legislators,4 7 it is
argued that Congress unconstitutionally interfered in the judici-
ary's power to resolve cases and controversies, 4 while also vesting
legislative authority in judges.4 9 This issue was explored exten-
sively in Mistretta.50
The Supreme Court ruled in Mistretta that Congress did not vio-
late the separation of powers principles in their scheme to resolve
excessive disparity in criminal sentencing.51 The petitioner in
Mistretta was a cocaine dealer who challenged the Guidelines con-
stitutionality on the grounds that a sentencing commission vio-
lated Separation of Powers.52 The Court based its decision on four
grounds. 53 First, the Court determined that the location of the
43 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). The Constitu-
tion diffuses power by "enjoin[ing] upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity." Id.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1993) (establishing independent commission consisting of
seven voting members and one nonvoting member). See generally Black, supra note 21, at
779. The President must choose judges from a list supplied by the Judicial Conference of
the United States. Id.
45 See infra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (arguing Guidelines eliminate judiciary's
Article Three powers).
46 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 (vesting judiciary with power to resolve all cases and
controversies); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1993) (establishing Sentencing Commission
within judicial branch).
47 See Black, supra note 21, at 779-80 (discussing objection to granting executive and
legislative power to judicial branch).
48See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The article provides in relevant part:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Con-
stitution, the laws of the United States ... to all controversies to which the United
States shall be a party;-to controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and citizens of another State;-between citizens of different States.
Id.
49 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1993). The President is allowed to appoint three fed-
eral judges referred to him by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. The judges
may serve on the Commission, in addition to serving on the bench. Id. Furthermore, the
President may remove the judges, but removal does not affect the judge's position on the
bench. Id.
50 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-412 (1989) (discussing separation of
powers doctrine).
51 See id. at 412 (holding Constitution does not prohibit delegating to judicial branch
task of formulating guidelines so long as statutory direction provided).
52 Id. at 361. Mistretta pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute, and was
sentenced to eighteen months under the Guidelines. Id.
53 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for upholding con-
stitutionality of Guidelines).
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commission within the judicial branch was permissible, because
the commission's nonadjudicatory functions did not invade the
prerogatives of another branch.54 Second, the Court reasoned that
Congress could delegate nonadjudicatory functions to the judicial
branch, provided Congress did not violate the prerogatives of any
other branch. 5 It was held that the courts' extra-judicial activity
in promulgating sentences was within the integrity of their
branch. 56 Third, the Court found that judicial service on the com-
mission did not impair the primary function of the judiciary in ad-
judicating cases, provided it assumed a purely administrative
role.57 Fourth, the Court determined that the presidential power
to remove and appoint members to the committee did not prevent
the judicial branch from performing its constitutional duties.58
Initially, it appeared that the Court properly upheld the Guide-
lines because the system of checks and balances did not prohibit
Congress from calling upon the experience and knowledge of the
judicial branch in creating policies uniquely within the purview of
judges.59 However, this is problematic when judges depart from
the Guidelines and the sentence is appealed. Placing judges on
the Sentencing Commission threatens impartiality, because
judges are predisposed to rule in favor of policies their fellow
judges aided in promulgating.6 0 Thus, a paradox is created,
whereby a judge on appellate review must decide whether to up-
hold the judicially created sentence or to affirm a colleague's dis-
cretionary departure.
C. The Due Process Issue
Currently, the constitutional debate surrounding the SRA is de-
rived from Due Process attacks which were not addressed in Mis-
54 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383-89.
55 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 389-96 (1989).
56 Id. at 391.
57 Id. at 402-04. The Constitution does not forbid judges to have two functions, provided
they do not perform them simultaneously. Id.
58 Id. at 406-12.
59 Id. at 412.
60 See Kristin L. Timm, Note, 'The Judge Would Then be the Legislature": Dismantling
Separation of Powers in the Name of Sentencing Reform-Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 647 (1989), 65 WASH. L. Rav. 249, 264 (1990) (discussing how serving on sentencing
commission threatens judges' impartiality); see also Wendy E. Ackerman, Comment, Sepa-
ration of Powers and Judicial Service on Presidential Commissions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 930,
1004-06 (1986) (discussing application of separation of powers tests on sentencing
commission).
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tretta.61 Critics argue that the Court's lack of discretion in apply-
ing mandatory punishment fails to provide defendants with
individualized sentences guaranteed by Due Process. 2 Courts
have unilaterally rejected this challenge, rationalizing that there
is still a fair measure of discretion, despite the rigid sentencing
structure.63 Furthermore, courts have held that individualized
sentencing is not guaranteed by the Constitution, except in capital
cases.64 Courts have consistently upheld the legislatures' author-
ity to limit judicial discretion with fixed sentences in noncapital
cases.65 They, however, have failed to realize that although there
61 See United States v. Thompson, 972 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Guidelines); United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1492-94 (D. Or. 1988)
(holding Guideline sentencing schemes do not constitute unlawful delegation of power nor
violate Due Process); United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 1174, 1181-84 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(upholding Guidelines as constitutional despite Due Process attacks); United States v.
Weidner, 692 F. Supp. 968, 971-74 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (holding SRA does not violate Due
Process or Separation of Powers). But see United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1005
(D. Md. 1988) (finding SRA unconstitutional); United States v. Martinez-Ortega, 684 F.
Supp. 634, 636 (D. Idaho 1988) (finding Guidelines violate separation of powers doctrine);
United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 818-19 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that Guidelines
violate Due Process).
62 See United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing individu-
alization of sentences and holding Guidelines do not violate Due Process), cert denied, 493
U.S. 865 (1989); see also United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1310-11 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional as denying Due Process), overruled by United
States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121,
1163 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding Guidelines unconstitutional on Due Process grounds), over-
ruled by United States v. Perey-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Davis, 715 F. Supp. 1473, 1474 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding Guidelines violate Due Process
because they lack individualized sentences).
63 See Ehrsam v. Rubenstein, 917 F.2d 764, 766 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding Due Process
permits mandatory sentencing), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 926 (1991); see also United States v.
Wilkins, 911 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Congress need not give courts discretion
to individualize sentences). See generally United States v. Wayne, 903 F.2d 1188, 1198
(8th Cir. 1990) (no right to individualized sentences); United State3 v. Green, 902 F.2d
1311, 1313 (8th Cir.1990) (holding "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee individualized
sentencing, except in capital cases." (quoting United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828
(8th Cir. 1989))); United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.) (no individualized
sentences in non-capital cases), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 968 (1989); United States v. Pinto,
875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding Due Process establishes no right to individual-
ized sentences); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir.) (holding no constitu-
tional requirement for individualized sentences), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989).
64 See Green, 902 F.2d at 1313 (noting Guidelines do not remove discretion from sentenc-
ing courts and "in any event the Constitution does not guarantee individualized sentenc-
ing, except in capital cases." (quoting Brittman, 872 F.2d at 828)); see also Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (1991) (holding individualized sentences required in capi-
tal cases only); United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 823 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (holding
mandatory service of judges violate separation of powers doctrine).
65 See United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (when government does
not file motion for sentencing departure under section 3553(e) of the Guidelines, courts
have no authority to depart from mandatory statutory minimum sentence); United States
v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989) (sentencing not sole function of judiciary and
legislative branch may place limits or eliminate sentencing discretion of courts); see also
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1989) (judicial discretion is matter of
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is continued discretion to depart from the sentencing range, the
mandatory alternatives still promote severity.66
A judge may enhance or depart from the sentencing range de-
pending on a finding of fact made at sentencing.67 Thus, under the
Guidelines, the reliability of the evidentiary basis for facts found
at sentencing is of the utmost importance .6  This is especially true
in drug-related cases where a defendant is convicted of possessing
a certain quantity of a drug, but the prosecution at sentencing pro-
duces evidence that the offender was part of a much larger ship-
ment.69 Critics suggest that since the judges' determinations sub-
stantially impact the adjustments made to the base offense level,
they should conduct more formal hearings in order to comply with
Due Process. 7
D. The Application of the Eighth Amendment
Many critics question the severity of the punishments provided
for in the Guidelines, in that the Guidelines fail to take into ac-
count mitigating factors. 71 Defendants contend that severe prison
congressional control); United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1373 (1989) (court lim-
its judicial discretion in departing from Guidelines unless process initiated by defendant);
People v. Meeks, 285 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (legislature free to delegate or
remove sentencing discretion).
66 See Gary Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinant Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 61 n.321 (1993) (discussing statutory
scheme possession of cocaine with intent to distribute). Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the
term would be not less than 10 years, or more than life imprisonment. Id. However, if the
offender has a prior drug conviction the sentence is increased to not less than twenty years.
Id.
67 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL §§ 5K2.1 to .14, at 246-49 (1987) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL] (judges may depart
from Guidelines when individual case presents facts "that have not been given adequate
consideration by the commission").
68 See United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 667 (1989) (facts are translated through
Guidelines into sentencing range).
69 See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (upholding state statute requir-
ing proof of sentencing factors by preponderance of evidence); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 459 (1984) (holding there is no jury trial at sentencing); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661
(1988) (hearsay is admissible at sentencing). See generally Susan Herman, The Tail that
Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289, 290 (1992). At sentencing there is no trial by
jury, no right of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and hearsay is admissible. Id.
70 See Lisa Rebello, Note, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Five
Years of"Guided Discretion", 26 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 1031, 1053 (1992) (outlining proposal
that judges should conduct more formal sentencing hearings than traditionally practiced in
order to comply with Due Process).
71 See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1949. The only offender characteristics included in the
Guidelines are past criminal record and acceptance of responsibility which slightly miti-
gates an offender's "offense level." Id.; see also Lowenthal, supra note 66, at 113. The au-
thor questions sentencing violators on basis of weight of substance without regarding pu-
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sentences are grossly disproportionate to the harm they caused to
the public by their crimes.72 This is especially prevalent in drug
related cases, where the sentencing mentality focuses predomi-
nantly on retribution, rather than rehabilitation.73 Terrebonne v.
Butler,7 4 illustrates this disparity. In Terrebonne, the court upheld
a mandatory life sentence without parole. 75 This sentence was
imposed on a heroin addict with two prior convictions for distribu-
tion committed to support his habit.76 In cases such as these,
where the defendant is a nonviolent addict, rehabilitation rather
than costly incarceration for life may be a wiser use of limited
resources.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
ment disproportionate to the defendant's offense. 7 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting capi-
tal punishment when it would exceed the seriousness of the of-
fense.78 It would appear that since the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its the imposition of excessive fines and the punishment of death
when disproportionate to the offender's crime, it should follow that
rity. Id. For cases which have upheld this provision consistently, see United States v.
Chapman, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1927-28 (1991) (holding sentencing scheme rational in LSD
cases to punish large-scale drug dealers), United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175, 1177-78
(lth Cir.) (sentencing rationally related to Congress's power to protect public health and
safety), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1058 (1988), and United States v. Restrepo, 676 F. Supp. 368,
377 (D. Mass. 1987) (sentencing scheme not arbitrary), affd, 867 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1988).
72 See, e.g., Young v. Miller, 883 F.2d 1276, 1285-86 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding
mandatory life sentence without parole for first time offender convicted of heroin posses-
sion with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2886 (1991); Terrebonne v. Butler
848 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding life sentence without parole for heroin addict
with two prior convictions for distributing heroin committed to support habit), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1020 (1989); see also United States v. Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (9th Cir.
1989) (upholding five year mandatory minimum for possession with intent to distribute
cocaine).
73 See Kidder, 869 F.2d at 1333-34 (upholding five year sentence without parole); see also
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-72 (1982) (upholding forty year sentence for possession of
less than nine ounces of marijuana).
74 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
75 Terrebonne, 848 F.2d at 507.
76 Id.
77 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "exces-
sive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punish-
ment inflicted." Id.
78 See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986) (Eighth Amendment violated if death
penalty imposed on defendant who did not kill); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 783
(1982) (death penalty violates Eighth Amendment when defendant does not commit or at-
tempt murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 585 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding
death sentence violated Eighth Amendment for kidnapping and rape was disproportionate
to crime committed).
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this would likewise apply to excessive incarceration. 79 However,
this is not the case. The Supreme Court has frequently vacillated
on this issue without fashioning a viable standard.8 0 This is high-
lighted by the disparate treatment of the defendants in Hutto v.
Davis"' and Solem v. Helm. 2 In Hutto, the Supreme Court upheld
a forty year sentence for possession of less than nine ounces of
marijuana.8 3 On the other hand, in Solem, a nondrug case, five
Justices determined that a life sentence without parole for seven
nonviolent felonies violated the Eighth Amendment.8 4 These deci-
sions illustrate the disproportionate sentencing in drug related of-
fenses. A proper standard within the Guidelines should include a
mitigating factor relating to the degree of violence in connection
with the crime.8 5 Under this proposed standard the nonviolent de-
fendant in Hutto, received a punishment disproportionate to the
crime he committed.
Recently, in Harmelin v. Michigan,"6 the Supreme Court upheld
a Michigan statute which permitted a judge to impose a life sen-
tence without parole where the defendant was in possession of
more than 650 grams of illegal narcotics.8 7 The plurality opinion
concluded that Solem should be overruled and the sentencing
79 See Lowenthal, supra note 66, at 114 (discussing challenges to severity of
punishments).
80 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 349 (1910) (overturning fifteen year sen-
tence in Philippines as violating Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). But compare
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-72 (1982) (forty year sentence upheld) with Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 277 (1983) (declaring year later that life sentence without parole for
seven nonviolent felonies violated Eighth Amendment).
81 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
82 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
83 See Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370.
84 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 279, 303 (Court overturned sentence on grounds that defend-
ant was given sentence with no eligibility for release, except for executive pardon).
85 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2713 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White would have applied a three prong test articulated in Solem to determine whether a
particular incarceration would have violated the Eighth Amendment. Id Under this test,
the sentence would be reviewed by (1) the gravity of the defendant's offense and the sever-
ity of the punishment; (2) the sentence imposed on similar criminals in the jurisdiction; and
(3) the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions. Id.
86 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
87 Id. at 2684; see MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7403(2Xa)(i) (West Supp. 1990-91). The
statute provides a mandatory sentence of life in prison for possession of 650 grams or more
of "any mixture containing (a schedule 2] controlled substance." Id.; MICH. ComP. LAws
ANN. § 333.7214(aXiv) (West Supp. 1990-91). The statute defines cocaine as a schedule 2
controlled substance. Id.; MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 791.234(4) (West Supp. 1990-91). The
statute provides eligibility for parole after 10 years in prison, except for those convicted of
either first-degree murder or "a major controlled substance offense." Id.; MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 791.233b[1](b) (West Supp. 1990-91). The statute defines "major controlled sub-
stance offense" as any violation of section 333.7403. Id.
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length should remain a legislative function.88 Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy reasoned that drug possession created a substantial
threat of violence, because drug users tended to commit other of-
fenses.8 9 Although this may be true, a drug offender who has not
endangered anyone other than himself, may be subject to life in
prison because other more dangerous drug users commit the same
offense. 90 The current Guidelines impose a life sentence without
contemplating mitigating factors such as rehabilitation, prior
criminal history or violent disposition.91 The Guidelines imprison
drug users, who do not threaten society, for life, when prison space
could be used for more dangerous offenders.
Apparently, the drug epidemic has a profound effect on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution.92 After
Harmelin, it appears that no member of the Court will interfere
in the "offense grading" of noncapital punishment for violent
crimes.9 3 Furthermore, the majority of the Court will uphold any
period of incarceration, including life without parole, for all drug
trafficking convictions or simple possession cases, provided the de-
88 See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686-98. The Court offered a historical analysis of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause as not including the concept of proportionality. Id.
Justice Scalia opined that appellate review which includes proportionality substitutes judi-
cial views for legislative determinations. Id.
89 See id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Justice Kennedy stated that estab-
lishing prison terms "is properly within the province of Legislators, not courts." Id. at 2703
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980)). In Justice Kennedy's view, life
imprisonment without parole is proportional to an offense involving a substantial amount
of drug possession because drug users are likely to commit other offenses and threaten
others. Id. at 2706-07. Justice Kennedy based his decision on the effects drugs have on
individuals. Id. at 2706. Justice Kennedy explained: (1) drug induced changes in physiolog-
ical functions, cognitive reasoning and mood which may facilitate crime; (2) drug users may
commit crimes in order to pay for their drug habit; and (3) violent crime is a part of the
drug business. Id.
90 See Lowenthal, supra note 66, at 116 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's contrast of Harme-
lin's crime with that of defendant in Solem, whose crime did not involve violence).
91 See U.S. Department of Justice: An Analysis of Non-Violent Drug Offenders with
Criminal Histories, 54 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2101, 2107 (Feb. 16, 1994) [hereinafter Crim. L.
Rep.] (single most important determinant in offenders' sentence length is drug quantity);
see also GUuDEL1S MANUAL, supra note 67, at § 3B1.1 to .2 (allowing for two to four level
increase or decrease in offense level depending on extent of participation).
92 See generally Lowenthal, supra note 66, at 117-18; Black, supra note 21, at 769 (inter-
preting Constitution in context of Federal Sentencing Guidelines). The legislature can be
as harsh as it desires without crossing constitutional lines in mandating life in prison with-
out parole for all drug traffic and simple possession convictions, provided defendant pos-
sesses a substantial amount of drugs. Id.
93 See Lowenthal, supra note 66, at 117 (discussing courts' disinclination to review laws
that mandate life imprisonment without parole for offenses that directly threaten safety of
others).
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fendant possessed a substantial amount.94 Unfortunately, this ap-
proach places all offenders in the same category, and ignores drug
couriers or marginally involved offenders. 95 Under the Guidelines,
the most significant determinant in sentencing is drug quantity.96
The defendant's role has only minimal impact on the eventual sen-
tence length.97 Therefore, it is contended that under the Guide-
lines, severe punishment for peripheral drug traffickers is grossly
disproportionate and a waste of limited resources.98 The limited
prison space and the cost of maintaining an individual for life
should be more wisely allocated for those such as "drug kingpins"
who are more directly involved in drug offenses which threaten
society.
II. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Much debate during the pre-Guidelines era focused on the prob-
lem of judicial discretion in determining sentences.99 Critics ar-
94 See id. at 118 n.300. The author speculates that Justice Marshall's dissent in Harme-
tin, replaced by newly appointed Justice Thomas will make it even less likely that the
Court will disturb harsh non-capital sentences in drug cases. Id.; see also Catherine
Bishop, Mandatory Sentences and Drug Cases: Is the Law Defeating its Purpose?, N.Y.
T MES, June 8, 1990, at B16 (examining judicial criticism of drug laws).
95 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). The
Court explained that statutes requiring first time offenders to be incarcerated for life re-
gardless of extenuating circumstances treats all offenders as "members of a faceless, undif-
ferentiated mass." Id. This applies predominately to cases in which offenders are appre-
hended with large amounts of drugs without the intent to distribute. Id.; see also Paul W.
Valentine, Margarine Heiress Gets 14 Years for Cocaine Distribution in Maryland, WASH.
PosT, Mar. 9, 1990, at A18. The author noted District Court Judge Harry Hupp's descrip-
tion of a 14 year sentence he was required to impose on a filing clerk convicted of possession
of crack cocaine and who had no prior contact with the law. Id. The filing clerk was trans-
porting 504 grams for her brother in exchange for $250 to buy Christmas presents. Id.
96 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing drug epidemic's effect on
Supreme Court's interpretation of Constitution).
97 See Crim. L. Rep. supra note 91, at 2102 (analyzing Federal Sentencing Guidelines
minimum mandatory sentences).
98 See Valentine, supra note 95, at A18 (discussing failure of increased arrests in elimi-
nating drug problem); see also Criminal Justice Report, supra note 8, at ii. Corrections
expenditures have nearly doubled to account for one-third of the total $74 billion justice
expenditures. Id. Between 1984 and 1990, prison capacity increased 60%, but the number
of prisoners increased 70%. Id. at 6; see also Crim. L. Rep., supra note 91, at 2102. The
Bureau of Prisons estimates that it costs approximately twenty thousand dollars per year
to house a federal prisoner. Id.
99 See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (holding that in dischargingjudge's duty to impose proper sentence, judge was authorized to consider mitigating and
aggravating circumstances); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949) (judge's broad
sentencing discretion overrode jury's life imprisonment recommendation, changing it to
death sentence); United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1981) (court did not err
in applying broad sentencing discretion); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Dis-
cretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904, 916 (1962). "[Tlhe new
penology has resulted in vesting in judges ... the greatest degree of uncontrolled power
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gued that this discretion, which would take into account a defend-
ant's personal and socioeconomic characteristics, was unfair and
ineffectual. 100 Consequently, different judicial views as to the root
causes of crime led to disparity in sentencing.l0 1
The Guidelines, however, have not eliminated judicial discre-
tion.10 2 Under the Guidelines, judges may depart from the re-
quired minimum sentence under certain circumstances. 0 3 Depar-
ture from the Guidelines turns on whether the defendant has
"accepted responsibility" for the criminal conduct.10 4 This depar-
ture acts as a "gap filler" for those cases which did not fall
squarely within the types of situations contemplated by the draft-
ers.105 The ability to reduce sentences has proven helpful in en-
over the liberty of human beings that one can find in the legal system." Id.; Ilene H. Nagel,
Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CriM. L.
& CuminuoLorY 883, 896 nn.76-77 (1990) (citing works commenting on problem with judi-
cial discretion in sentencing).
100 See H.R. REP. No. 1017, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-36, 54 & 56 (1984). The members of
the House and Senate in debating the SRA wanted to increase the honesty in the sentenc-
ing system, implying the old system to be replaced was dishonest and unfair. Id.; S. REP.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, 56 & 159-61 (1983) (discussing reasons for establishing
minimum mandatory sentences); see also Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1942. "[Plrior sentenc-
ing practices offered little hope for reform, because judges were not required to explain
their reasons for imposing sentences .... "Id.
101 See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). Judges are "largely unlimited
either as to the kind of information [they] may consider, or the source from which it may
come." Id. See generally Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1696 (1992) (stat-
ing that judges often disagreed on whether particular categories of offenders should be
incapacitated, rehabilitated, deterred, or punished); Steven Y. Koh, Reestablishing the
Federal Judges Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1113 (1992). Since judges could
freely draw upon any information to impose a sentence, defendants often did not know the
rationale behind their sentences, since explanations were not required. Id.
102 See J. Gordon Seymour, Comment, Downward Departures from the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Based on the Defendant's Drug Rehabilitative Efforts, 59 U. Cm. L. REV.
837, 841 (1992). Guidelines allow for judges to use discretion in awarding a two point re-
duction in offense level when the defendant "clearly demonstrate[s] a recognition and af-
firmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." Id. (quoting
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 67, at § 3E1.1).
103 See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 67, at § 3E1.1. The manual lists several factors
for courts to consider when deciding whether or not to depart from the guidelines: (a) vol-
untary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations; (b) voluntary pay-
ment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt; (c) voluntary and truthful admission to
authorities of involvement in the offense and related conduct; (d) voluntary surrender to
authorities promptly after commission of offense; (e) voluntary assistance to authorities in
the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense; (f) voluntary resignation
from the office or position held during the commission of the offense; and (g) the timeliness
of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility. Id.
104 Id.
105 See United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1990). The government has
an interest in encouraging defendants to cooperate with law enforcement efforts. Id. The
reasonable use of substantial assistance motions will make others more likely to do so in
the future. Id.; see also United States v. Sorensen, 915 F.2d 599, 602 (10th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing substantial assistance is grounds for departure).
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couraging voluntary cooperation by criminals in testifying against
others, which resulted in increasing the number of drug-related
convictions. 1 0 6
However, the Guidelines' effect on the traditional role of the ju-
diciary in the sentencing phase continues to concern some
judges.10 7 They view the Guidelines as an infringement on their
rights to apply their experience in an effort to construct "individ-
ual sentences."10 8 Judges believe this "individualized" form of
punishment is more compassionate and equitable, since it is tai-
lored to the defendant's personal situation.'0 9
A. Judicial Discretion in Drug-Related Cases
The debate surrounding the role of judicial discretion is particu-
larly prevalent in drug-related cases." 0 The major issue is
106 See United States v. Anders, 899 F.2d 570, 580 (6th Cir. 1990) (downward departure
may be appropriate where conduct significantly differs from norm); United States v. Rog-
er, 972 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacated and remanded district court's decision deny-
ing defendant's request for downward departure based on extraordinary acceptance of re-
sponsibility as indicated by surrendering confession); cf United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d
90, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (government not compelled to request reduction even though police
officer promised cooperation would be rewarded); United States v. Jetter, No. 3-93-213,
1994 WL 17530, at *3 (D. Conn. 1994) (repeat offender confessed and identified photos of
other participants).
107 See Jack B. Weinstein, No More Drug Cases, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 1993, at 2. Judge
Weinstein stated:
On one day last week, I had to sentence a... West African woman to 46 months in a
drug case. The result of her young children will undoubtedly be .... devastating....
These ... cases confirm my sense of depression about much of the cruelty I have been a
party to in connection with the "war on drugs" . . . I simply cannot sentence another
impoverished person whose destruction has no discernable effect on the drug trade. I
wish I were in a position ... to propose some solution.., but I am not.
Id.
108 See United States v. Andruska, 964 F.2d 640, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1992) (Will, J., concur-
ring) (serious defects and injustices in Guidelines sentencing process has been noted by
number of courts); United States v. Mobley 956 F.2d 450, 461 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting com-
mentators have remarked that Guidelines inflexibility in calculating sentencing ranges,
has effected shift from judicial to prosecutorial discretion); United States v. Harrington,
947 F.2d 956, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring). "[Als we have come to learn,
the Guidelines are rigid in formulation and, thus, often produce harsh results that are
patently unfair because they fail to take account of individual circumstances that might
militate in favor of a properly 'tailored' sentence." Id.
109 See United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing individu-
alization of sentences), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989). See generally Rebello, supra note
70, at 1053-54. While defendants have no right to individualized sentencing, some courts
have criticized the Guidelines for their failure to fully address differences among offenders.
Id.
110 See United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490, 1490 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing judicial
discretion in sentencing process); United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir.
1990). "It is by now apodictic that the sentencing guidelines effectively stunt the wide dis-
cretion which district judges formerly enjoyed in criminal'sentencing." Id.; United States v.
Seluk, 873 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1989). "We accept appellants contention that the guidelines
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whether judges are allowed to reduce an offenders sentence when
it is shown they have successfully undertaken "rehabilitative" ef-
forts such as voluntarily terminating drug use and enrolling in a
rehabilitation program.111 Courts have refused to diminish
sentences, despite evidence of rehabilitation, based on four major
grounds." 2 First, these courts believe that the Sentencing Com-
mission adequately considered rehabilitation when they formu-
lated the Guidelines." 3 Rehabilitation is currently viewed as "pos-
toffense" conduct which is not taken into account in determining a
sentence, unlike "acceptance of responsibility" for which down-
ward departure would be allowed. 1 4 Second, these courts argue
that the Commission adequately considered rehabilitation in the
Guidelines' proscription against downward departure based on a
defendant's drug dependency at the time the crime was commit-
ted. 1 5 Some courts have stated that this explicit rejection of de-
pendency, as a grounds for departure; must include a rejection of
rehabilitation, since an offender cannot become rehabilitated un-
less he is an addict.1 16 Third, some courts reason that factoring in
curtail the sentencing judge's discretion." Id.; United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121,
1135-36 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (overview of judicial discretion debate).
11I See Seymour, supra note 102, at 837 (examining whether rehabilitation should be
used as factor for downward departure of sentences imposed by Guidelines). The author
suggests rehabilitation efforts should be included within the "acceptance of responsibility"
adjustment provided in the Guidelines. Id. at 840; see also GUIDELIES MANUAL, supra note
67, at § 3E1.1 (allowing two level reduction in offense level for affirmative acceptance of
personal responsibility).
112 See Seymour, supra note 102, at 841 (court reasoned that allowing departure would
subvert purpose of Guidelines).
113 Id. Ifjudges reconsider rehabilitation as a factor, it would violate the spirit of the Act.
Id.
114 Id. at 844. (discussing courts' reluctance to use rehabilitation as a means for depart-
ing from Guidelines); see also United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 1990) (drug
rehabilitation found inconsistent with underlying nature of factors included in Guidelines);
United States v. Braxton, 903 F.2d 292, 292 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing lower courts decision
that rehabilitation was necessary element of acceptance of responsibility), rev'd on other
grounds, 500 U.S 344 (1991).
115 See Seymour, supra note 102, at 845. Courts rejected rehabilitation as grounds for
departure based on the speculative assessment of section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines. Id.; see
also David I. Shapiro, Note, Sentencing the Reformed Addict: Departure Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Problem of Drug Rehabilitation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 2051,
2061 (1991). Although the Guidelines do not speak directly to the issue of drug rehabilita-
tion, the Guidelines provide that "[dirug or alcohol dependence or abuse is not a reason for
imposing a sentence below the guidelines." Id. (quoting Gums.LmNs MANUAL, supra note
67, at § 5H1.4).
116 See United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J.,
dissenting) (drug dependency is not reason for imposing sentence below Guidelines);
United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 162, 163 (9th Cir. 1990) (rehabilitation not grounds for
departure since already taken into account by commission when formulating Guidelines);
United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
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rehabilitation would violate the spirit of the SRA since the Guide-
lines were designed to shift from rehabilitation toward a more de-
terrence based system of punishment. 1 17 Therefore, to allow reha-
bilitation to affect sentencing would be inconsistent. Finally,
courts argue that such an approach would provide special treat-
ment in the form of lighter sentences to the drug addict, over the
nonaddicted user who did not need rehabilitation.""
Proponents of judicial discretion, particularly in drug-related
cases, denote the Guidelines' failure to effectively fight the "War
on Drugs."119 These judges believe a more compassionate ap-
proach should be taken with the "small time" user. 120 Judge Jack
Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, along with Judge Whitman Knapp of the South-
ern District of New York, in protest to the harshness of the Guide-
lines, refuse to preside over drug related cases. 121
117 See, e.g., Braxton, 903 F.2d at 296 (court concluded that district court "misperceived
the purpose of the Guideline [§ 3E1.1] by interjecting into calculus need for rehabilita-
tion"); United States v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 1989) (acknowledgement of
wrongdoing does not constitute acceptance of responsibility); United States v. Urrego-Li-
nores, 879 F.2d 1234, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (voluntary cooperation after conviction not ac-
ceptance of responsibility), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989); United States v. White, 875
F.2d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 1989) (defendant not entitled reduction because pleading guilty not
acceptance of responsibility).
118 See Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133. See generally Seymour, supra note 102, at 851-52 (courts
argue departure for rehabilitated defendants is unfair since nonaddicted offenders have no
chance for reduction); Shapiro, supra note 115, at 2069 (rehabilitation should not be re-
warded since it would be tantamount to rewarding addict for being addicted).
119 See Fischler, supra note 10, at 2. The author cited utter futility of the Guidelines in
presiding over increased drug prosecutions. Id.; see also Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse than the Disease, 29 AM. CRmn. L. REv. 899, 900 (1992).
The author noted:
There is a widespread and pervasive feeling that no one is listening in Washington,
and that urgent demands for Guideline reforms are simply being ignored. Those who
created the Guidelines are so wedded to their tenacious defense that they remain obliv-
ious to the systemic dissonance they have created. The Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion, and the Congress which created it, simply are not getting the message, although
the message could not be clearer: Your cure is worse than the disease.
Id.
120 See Fischler, supra note 10 at 2 (concurring with Judge Wittman Knapp's policy to
boycott drug cases, citing inability to fashion individual sentences for small time users);
Marquez, supra note 6, at A10. Some court's have ruled that sentencing requirements for
career offenders is unconstitutional. Id. Judge Green sentenced drug offenders to ten years
rather than require a thirty year sentence. Id.
121 See Daniel Wise, Procedure Allows Drug Couriers to Receive Lighter Sentences, N.Y.
L.J., June 4, 1993, at 1. Prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York usually "bump
down" drug couriers' charges to the next lowest level to avoid harsh sentences. Id.; Daniel
Wise, Prosecutors End Run Guidelines, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1993, at 3 (discussing benefits
of judicial discretion in sentencing).
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From a statistical point of view, it is clear that the Guidelines
have failed to control the growth of drug offenses.' 22 An increase,
rather than a decrease, in drug offenses lend merit to the argu-
ments put forth by proponents of judicial discretion. 123 In contrast
to the Guidelines, a growing number of commentators reason that
rehabilitation would be a more sensible approach to the "small
scale" user.1 24 Rehabilitation would relieve prison overcrowding,
reduce the number of repeat offenders, and allow the majority of
efforts to center around the conviction of the "larger scale" deal-
ers.125 Allowing judges greater discretion to choose rehabilitation
for a small time addict, while reserving harsher penalties for vio-
lent large scale offenders, may represent a more efficient approach
towards fighting the "War on Drugs."
III. THE PROBLEM OF SENTENCING DIsPARITY
The Sentencing Guidelines were also an attempt to eliminate
disparity in sentences for similarly situated offenders. 126 The
Commission believed that judges relied too much on a defendant's
personal situation, rather than the harm caused.127 As a result,
defendants convicted of the same offense were given different
sentences depending on the judge presiding over the case. 128 Not
only have the Guidelines not eliminated the disparity, but the
Guidelines have damaged the integrity and fairness of the crimi-
122 See Criminal Justice Report, supra note 8, at 7 (discussing drug offenders increase in
prison population).
123 See Tackett, supra note 9, at 6. The author stated:
The result has been a record number of arrests and prison terms. The government
reported... that the prison population of the state and federal prisons rose 42,862 in
the first half of 1990 to a record 755,425 inmates. Drug crimes fueled the increase.
Id.
124 See Marquez, supra note 6, at A10 (advocating work release and random drug testing
for, small-time users).
125 Id.
126 See H.R. REP. No. 1017, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-36, 54, 56 (1984) (discussing need for
honesty in sentencing); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1. st Sess. 52, 56, 159-61 (1983) (same).
See generally Berlin, supra note 3, at 191. "Members of the Senate and the House wanted
the Commission to eliminate... the disparity in sentencing, and the uncertainty about the
amount of time an offender would actually serve on a prison sentence." Id.
127 See Berlin, supra note 3, at 193. The author discussed the pre-Guidelines approach to
sentencing, whereby judges often took into account such factors as defendant's age, educa-
tion, vocational skills, mental condition, family ties, and previous employment record when
determining an appropriate sentence. Id. at 193 n.38.
128 See S. REP No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, 56, 159-61 (1983) (sentences for identi-
cal crimes varied widely). In this study, fifty judges, after being given the same presentence
report, imposed varying sentences. Id. at 3224 n.22. For example, bank robbery sentences
ranged from ten years imprisonment to five years probation. Id. at 3225-26.
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nal justice system. 129 Reverting back to a guided "judicial discre-
tion" approach, while not completely eliminating the disparity,
may be a more effective solution for drug related cases.
A. The Prosecutor's Ability to Affect Sentencing
A common observation with respect to the Guidelines is that
rather than eliminating disparity, the Guidelines merely shift the
power to affect sentencing from the judge to the prosecution. 130
This is unfair due to a prosecutor's partiality toward achieving a
maximum sentence, as compared to the judge's impartial role.131
Placing this power within the prosecutor's purview, while simulta-
neously restricting judicial discretion, has led to some very ques-
tionable results, particularly in cases that involve drugs such as
LSD.13 2
LSD is a liquid commonly placed on other substances such as
blotter paper, sugar cubes, or gelatin tablets. This is done before
sale so as to make ingestion easier. In Chapman v. United
States,133 the Supreme Court highlighted the manner in which
this process leads to possible sentence manipulation.1 3 4 The de-
fendant possessed 50 milligrams of pure LSD, however, the Court
held that the total weight of the drugs in addition to the blotter on
which it was placed, must be used to determine the sentence
129 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 61. The enactment of the Guidelines and its rigid sen-
tencing requirements in drug-related cases have devastated the criminal justice system. Id.
The author stated he was "convinced that [the Guidelines'] enactment arose out of legisla-
tive frustration... I can also tell you that they daily require the imposition of sentences
which are horribly unjust." Id.
130 See United States v. Dockery, 965 F.2d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (enlargement of
prosecutors' role does not warp criminal justice system); United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d
244, 255 (3d Cir.) (expansion of prosecutors role does not violate Due Process), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 529 (1991); United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the court
held that the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines did not violate Due Process by
shifting influence over sentencing from the judiciary to the prosecutor), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 471 (1992); see also United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989) (sentencing
not solely judicial function), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990); Uelmen, supra note 119, at
900. "The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, quite simply, take that task away from judges
and turn it over to prosecutors. Prosecutors, I would contend, are ill-equipped to perform
the ultimate function of apportioning justice among the plethora of defendants who play
varying roles in the typical criminal enterprises prosecuted in federal courts today." Id.
131 See Melissa M. McGrath, Comment, Federal Sentencing Law: Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Determining Departures Based on Defendant's Cooperation Violates Due Process, 15
S. ILL. U. L.J. 321, 340-44 (1991) (Guidelines currently allow prosecution to fashion
favorable sentences).
132 See infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text (discussing broad discretion given to
prosecutors).
133 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
134 Id. at 1922.
19941 WAR ON DRUGS
under the Guidelines. 135 This increased the weight to 5.7 grams,
and lead to a harsher sentence. 3 6 This ruling provides prosecu-
tors with more power in their "sting" operations, since they now
could obtain harsher convictions by placing the LSD on heavier
substances such as sugar cubes, rather than a lighter substance
like blotter paper. 137 Consequently, sentences for otherwise simi-
lar offenses may be grossly disproportionate, even though the
amount of actual LSD in each case is identical. 38
This illustration demonstrates that the Guidelines not only
failed to eliminate sentencing disparity, but actually increased it
in certain situations. 39 This disparity violates the purpose of the
Guidelines and public policy as well. 140 Since it has been shown
that disparity cannot be totally eliminated, it may be more sensi-
ble to focus on a defendant's personal characteristics and degree of
violence in determining the sentence.
135 Id. "We hold that it is the weight of the blotter paper containing the LSD, and not the
weight of the pure LSD, which determines eligibility for the minimum sentence." Id.
136 Id. at 1922. The Guidelines impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for
possession of 1 gram of pure LSD. Id. The defendant was sentenced to 96 months in prison,
even though "the [actual pure] LSD by itself weighed only about 50 milligrams, not even
close to the one gram necessary to trigger the 5-year mandatory minimum of
§ 841(b)(1)(BXv).' Id.
137 See Berlin, supra note 3, at 213 (these types of disparate results provide incentive for
manipulation of investigations and sting operations by prosecutors, defying congressional
goal of eliminating sentencing disparity).
138 See United States v. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1924 (1991). Dealers selling 100
doses could receive the following disparate sentences:
Base Offense
Carrier Weight Level Guideline Range
Sugar Cube 227 gr. 36 188-235 (mos)
Blotter Paper 1.4 gr. 26 63-78 (mos)
Gelatin Capsule 225 mg. 18 27-33 (mos)
Pure[ ] LSD 5 mg. 12 10-16 (mos)
Id.; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 901, 918-24 (1991) (discussing rationale put forth in
Chapman).
139 See Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meet-
ing Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 429-34
(1991). There are three ways in which disparity continues: (1) overbroad categories result
in similar sentences for unlike offenders; (2) exclusion of facts or charges per plea agree-
ments significantly alters sentencing decisions; and (3) excessive or inappropriate judicial
departure from Guidelines. Id.
140 See William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SEr. REP. 339,
341 (1991). The author explained:
We are paying a high price for the present sentencing system, and not only in dollars.
It is a high price in terms of the integrity of the criminal justice process, in terms of
human life and the moral capital of the system. The elimination of unwarranted dis-
parities is a worthy objective but it has not been achieved. Instead a system conducive
to producing arbitrary results has been created.
Id.
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IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
Many hoped that stricter sentences would represent a "quick
fix" for this national tragedy."' Unfortunately, statistics show the
present strategy has failed.1 2 Various proposals have been put
forth in an attempt to restore fairness and integrity to the sen-
tencing system." 3
A. Guided Discretion: Offenders' Characteristics
One proposed reform would allow a judge the discretion to take
into account an offender's characteristics."4 This reform would al-
low judges to consider mitigating factors such as poverty, which
tends to explain an offenders criminal culpability. 145 Proponents
of this approach argue that the Guidelines should allow for a
number of "grade levels" for which these factors could reduce a
defendant's sentence. 14 It is believed this could cure the Guide-
lines' indifference toward socioeconomic conditions and their rela-
tions to drug use."47 This reform would represent a compassionate
approach towards individualized sentencing which would be con-
141 See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text (discussing shift from rehabilitation to-
wards stricter mandatory sentences); see also Knapp, supra note 1, at 61. The Guidelines
arose out of the legislature's frustration with the nation's drug problem, and its past fail-
ures to effectively combat the epidemic. Id.
142 See Meisler, supra note 9, at 20, 24. The 1980s decline in the street price of drugs
indicated that increased law enforcement did not hurt the drug trade. Id. A Rand Corpora-
tion report concluded that intensified law enforcement efforts, along with harsher prison
sentences, have actually raised the violence in the drug trade because now dealers must
resist to avoid incarceration. Id. at 20.
143 See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1956 (discussing proposals to reform); see also KEN-
1rT C. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 58-59 (1977) (advocating
importance of discretion to supplement Guidelines).
144 See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1956. The author emphasized the importance of using
"guided discretion," and advocated that the Commission review the Supreme Court's death
penalty jurisprudence as a model. Id.
145 Id. at 1957. The author stated:
A guided discretion model would be easy to incorporate into the sentencing guidelines.
The guidelines could direct judges to consider as potentially mitigating factors ...
poverty, educational deprivation, and family instability-that tend to diminish our
sense of an individual law-breaker's culpability.
Id.
146 Id. Such an approach would allow the sentence to consider the individual's character-
istics relevant to mitigating the severity of their punishment.
147 See Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J.
1755, 1765-66 (1992). The author discussed the pros and cons of proposed amendments
which would allow departure from the Guidelines in certain situations. Id. These amend-
ments would take into consideration the offenders' characteristics, and give the judge more
flexibility to impose a sentence other than imprisonment. Id.
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sistent with Due Process. 1 48 Therefore, by restoring "guided judi-
cial discretion," a more equitable and reliable system of punish-
ment would be created.
B. The Use of Sentencing Panels
An alternative solution is the formation of sentencing panels. 149
Under this proposal, the Guidelines would be set aside, and the
Sentencing Commission would study "normal cases"150 and fash-
ion an appropriate sentence. 151 This sentence would then act as a
precedent for which a rotating three-judge panel could rely on as a
starting point for deliberation. 152 The panel would meet weekly or
monthly to sentence cases which accumulated over that time.15 3
Judges would then confer and the majority decision would deter-
mine the sentence.' 54 All these sentences would require a state-
ment of reason, and would include dissenting opinions. 155 The
panel would be obligated to either adhere to the commissions pre-
cedent or distinguish the case. 156 It is believed this would foster
communication between judges, the commission, and the courts,
thereby promoting fairness and uniformity in the sentencing
process. 15
7
148 See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1956 (predetermined sentencing procedures overlook
"the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties
of human kind" (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976))).
149 See generally Koh, supra note 101, at 1127 (proposing sentencing panels to inform
and monitor discretion).
150 Id. These cases would involve disadvantaged men and women who engage in small
scale drug dealing for easy money, therefore structuring an appropriate sentence for that
class. Id.
151 See Alschuler, supra note 138, at 916-17. A proposed alternative by Professor Al-
schuler would authorize the Commission to draft a type of administrative precedent for
certain recurring cases. Id.
152 See Koh, supra note 101, at 1127-28 (discussing benefits derived from such panels,
such as increased communication among judges); see also Peter A. Ozanne, Judicial Re-
view: A Case for Sentencing Guidelines and Just Desserts, in SENTENCING REFORM: ExPRIu-
MENTS IN REDUCING DIsPARrrY 180-85 (Martin L. Forst ed., 1982).
153 See Koh, supra note 101, at 1127. During these meetings the panel of judges would
benefit from the probation officer's testimony. Id. Along with this testimony, the judges
could examine defendant's demeanor and testimony in fashioning an appropriate sentence.
Id.
154 Id. at 1128. Professor Koh believes this would advance our understanding of sentenc-
ing and promote communication between judges.
155 Id. Professor Koh compares this proposal to the sentencing councils established dur-
ing the 1960s in the federal district courts of Detroit, New York, and Chicago. Id. However,
this proposal would require more formality, with the panels decision binding upon the trial
judge. Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. This fairness and uniformity in sentencing proposed by Professor Koh would cure
a basic deficiency in the current Guidelines. Id.
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Critics argue that this system creates "geographical disparity"
which would destroy the Nation's sentencing uniformity as a
whole, therefore violating the original purpose of the Guide-
lines. 5 ' Proponents counter that "local conditions" should affect
sentences in some instances in order to fulfill sentencing pur-
poses.159 Another criticism is that it places an additional burden
on the already overburdened federal courts by requiring another
time consuming sentencing process. 60 Although additional time
would be required for this new system, it would not be extraordi-
narily burdensome and the resulting benefits would outweigh any
hardships.
C. Defendants Who Overcome Their Drug Addiction Prior to
Sentencing
This proposal recognizes the Guidelines' failure to incorporate
an offender's attempt at drug treatment prior to sentencing as a
mitigating factor.' 6 ' It has been proposed that courts faced with
an addict who overcomes his dependency should incorporate this
factor in sentencing in one of three ways.' 62 Courts could select a
sentence from the bottom of the Guideline range;16 3 grant a two-
level sentence reduction; 64 or depart from the Guidelines. 65 De-
158 See Koh, supra note 101, at 1130. Although geographic disparity may be created, this
disparity may not violate public policy because "[u]ntil society reaches a consensus on sen-
tencing purposes, it cannot be said whether certain types of disparities, such as those be-
tween districts, should be deemed 'unwarranted.'" Id.
159 Id. at 1130. Proponents put forth an argument that the deterrence of illegal alien
smuggling may require a harsh sentence in states such as Texas, but the same sentence
would have little deterrent effect in a state such as Massachusetts. Id.
160 See Koh, supra note 101, at 1130 (author estimates new proposal would require three
times amount of judicial time); see also LESLIE T. WILKINS Er AL., SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
STRUCTURING JUDICIL DISCRETION 2-3 (1978) (noting overburdened federal courts do not
need time-consuming sentencing process).
161 See Winters, supra note 9, at 1200 (currently Guidelines do not expressly incorporate
success in drug treatment in sentencing formula).
162 See id. at 1200 (discussing amending Federal Sentencing Guidelines to provide for
offender's likelihood of success in drug treatment).
163 See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 956 (5th Cir. 1990). "[Tlhe Guide-
lines do not preclude consideration of a defendant's rehabilitative potential as a mitigating
factor within an applicable range of punishment." Id.; see also Winters, supra note 9, at
1221 (such proposal may not provide necessary amount of incentive for all defendants to
seek treatment).
164 See United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984, 985 (4th Cir.) (if rehabilitation is miti-
gating factor, then two level reduction appropriate), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838 (1990);
United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 966 (1st Cir. 1989) (defendant granted two level
reduction due to acceptance of responsibility for two prior convictions); see also Winters,
supra note 9, at 1222. Author proposes new Guideline section which would state that, if the
drug addict succeeds in overcoming his drug addiction or successfully participates in a drug
treatment program, he will have a three level reduction in the offense level. Id.
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parture from the Guidelines would provide greater incentive for
the addict to seek drug treatment.
D. Guideline Departure for Low-Level Drug Law Violators
Another proposal would allow departure from the Guidelines for
the low-level drug violator. This proposition encompasses soci-
ety's current retributivist attitude towards drugs offenders. This
approach recognizes that not only are most low-level drug offend-
ers non-violent, but shorter prison sentences have the same deter-
rent effect as the Guidelines' minimum mandatory sentences. 166
Low-level drug law violators are non-violent offenders with min-
imal or no prior criminal history, whose offense does not include
complex criminal activity.167 Studies by the Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") have indicated that low-level offenders constitute 36.1
percent of all drug law offenders, and 21.2 percent of the total sen-
tenced federal prison population. 168 Furthermore, the average
sentence of the low-level offender group amounts to a minimum of
81.5 months, which means individuals will serve 5.75 years before
they are released from prison. 169 However, recent studies have
shown that the recidivism rate for low-level drug offenders is 19.1
percent, as compared to 40.7 percent for drug offenders as a
whole.' 70  These statistics demonstrate that harsher prison
165 See United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1256 (D. Minn. 1990) (court departed
from Guidelines due to defendant's sincere remorse for her actions); United States v.
Carbonell, 737 F. Supp. 186, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (departure allowed for defendant since no
prior history of drug activity); United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1118
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (defendant found guilty of selling crack for $10 was allowed departure due
to personal characteristics).
166 See Crim L. Rep., supra note 91, at 2101. A study prepared by the Office of the Dep-
uty Attorney General, with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, indicates that
the amount of prison time has little effect on whether the low-level drug offender will be-
come a repeat offender. Id. In addition, the study states that increased sentences consume
valuable prison space which could be used more efficiently. Id. at 2102.
167 Id. at 2108. The study classified low level drug violators as non-violent offenders with
minimal or no prior criminal history, whose offense did not involve sophisticated criminal
activity, and who otherwise did not present negative characteristics which would prohibit
consideration for sentence modification. Id.
168 Id. at 2101. Classification assumes offenders have no prior violent criminal history.
Id. When the prison population that participated in the study was restricted to those with
zero criminal points, low level drug violators constituted 28.2 percent of all offenders and
16.6 percent of all sentenced prisoners. Id.
169 See id. at 2101 (two-thirds of drug offenders in Bureau of Prisons received mandatory
minimum sentences). Among low level drug offenders, sentences have increased 150 per-
cent above what they were prior to the enactment of the Guidelines. Id.
170 Id. at 2116; see Miles D. Harer, Recidivism Among Federal Prison Releasees in 1987,
in FEDERAL BUREAu OF PRISONS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (1993) (providing that lower criminal
history category defendants less likely to recidivate, than higher risk defendants).
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sentences for low-level drug offenders is unnecessary and costly.
The BOP's research over the last forty three years examining re-
cidivism predictors indicate that time served in prison has never
been found to decrease or increase the likelihood of recidivat-
ing.17 1 Therefore, decreasing low-level offenders sentences will not
only promote criminal justice policy goals, but also increase prison
space and re-allocate limited resources towards more violent high-
level drug offenders.
CONCLUSION
The national drug tragedy remains a serious problem. Since
these drug offenses constitute serious crimes, consideration of
criminal justice policy goals become increasingly complex. The re-
tributive goal focuses on mandatory minimum sentences and
longer guideline sentences as a means of combating this drug
problem. The rehabilitation approach favors less severe sentences
with a focus towards reducing recidivism. The Guidelines' pure
retributive reaction towards this national tragedy is an ineffective
and inefficient use of limited government resources.
While not advocating one criminal justice policy over another, it
cannot be denied that an incorporation of the two goals presents a
more reasonable alternative. The proposals outlined in this paper
reflect such an alternative. These proposals may design a federal
criminal justice policy that will achieve the same, if not better,
results while not posing an excessive economic burden on
taxpayer.
Matthew Campese & Patrick J. Dussol
171 See Crim. L. Rep., supra note 91, at 2117. A study of predictors such as time served,
age, education, prior arrests, work experience and drug and alcohol dependency have never
been found to change the likelihood of recidivating. Id.; see also Alan J. Beck & Bernard E.
Shipley, "Recidivism of Prisoner's Released in 1983", in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SPE-
CIL REPORT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1 (1989) (examining rearrests and reconviction
among prisoners in eleven states released in 1983).
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